Simulating Opinion Dynamics in Heterogeneous Communication by Quattrociocchi, Walter et al.
Simulating Opinion Dynamics in Heterogeneous
Communication Environments
Walter Quattrociocchi12, Rosaria Conte2, and Elena Lodi1
1 University of Siena - Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
“R.Magari” - Siena, Italy
2 Laboratory of Agent Based Social Simulation - Institute of Cognitive Sciences and
Technologies - CNR Rome, Italy
Abstract. Since the information available is fundamental for our per-
ceptions and opinions, we are interested in understanding the conditions
allowing for a good information to be disseminated. This paper explores
opinion dynamics by means of multi-agent based simulations when agents
get informed by different sources of information. The scenario imple-
mented includes three main streams of information acquisition, differing
in both the contents and the perceived reliability of the messages spread.
Agents’ internal opinion is updated either by accessing one of the infor-
mation sources, namely media and experts, or by exchanging information
with one another. They are also endowed with cognitive mechanisms to
accept, reject or partially consider the acquired information. We expect
that peer-to–peer communication and reliable information sources are
able both to reduce biased perceptions and to inhibit information cheat-
ing, possibly performed by the media as stated by the agenda-setting
theory. In the paper, after having shortly presented both the hypotheses
and the model, the simulation design will be specified and results will be
discussed with respect to the hypotheses. Some considerations and ideas
for future studies will conclude the paper.
1 Introduction
What is the effect of different information sources and communication processes
on agents’ opinions? Since the early thirties ([30, 2]) the informal study of social
influence has produced abundant evidence of structural factors affecting people’s
beliefs. In social life, agents are exposed to different communication systems in-
teracting with one another, ranging from one-to-many information transmission
typical of traditional broadcasting media, to one-to-one systems characterizing
the new media, but including several intermediate modalities. How do they in-
teract? Which one is most likely to exercise the strongest influence on agents’
opinions? Despite the importance social scientists attribute to the role of persua-
sive communication (think of the Hovland school of persuasion), different com-
munication systems have rarely been compared under natural conditions, and
even less in artificial experiments. Based on social impact theory ([19]) recent
simulation-based studies of opinion dynamics [31, 14, 18, 5, 12, 3, 22, 26] observe
ar
X
iv
:1
10
1.
30
85
v1
  [
cs
.SI
]  
16
 Ja
n 2
01
1
how numerically defined opinions spread and aggregate over a given population
as a function of the distance among the values agents assign to them. Within
these studies, however, the process of communication among the agents is not
explicitly addressed. Plunged into the same network, agents are assumed to ex-
change opinions as a function of the distance between them: the lower this is,
the more the agents are inclined to converge.
In this paper, the role of different forms of communication in opinion dynam-
ics is addressed with the help of agent based simulation. Opinions are numerically
defined on one parameter that stands for the certainty with which agents hold
them; as in the bounded confidence model ([7]), agents are assumed to exchange
their opinions based on the distance between them. However, we introduced
three modifications over the preceding works on opinion dynamics: agents (a)
share two relatively independent opinions, (b) are exposed to different forms of
communication, namely one-to-many and one-to-one, which will be character-
ized later on in the paper on a number of dimensions, and (c) receive inputs
from two distinct sources of information, expert and non-expert.
The first modification is suggested by the necessity to make the scenario more
realistic.
The latter modifications instead are needed to address a topical question.
It is a common opinion nowadays that the new media play a positive role in
the control and improvement of the quality of information circulating in a sys-
tem. To what extent is this opinion backed up by existing evidence? Comparing
the effects of peer-to-peer communication Vs traditional media on the diffusion
of opinions and observing their interaction, we aim to investigate whether the
former system is bound to amplify the effects of the latter, or can exercise a rel-
atively independent influence on information quality. To clearly distinguish the
effects of the two systems, we have introduced the distinction between the ex-
pert and the non-expert source. To what extent will the experts affect existing
opinions? How much expert-driven information must be accessed through the
new media for the average quality of information circulating in the population
to increase?
2 Within Different Communication Paradigms
Information is acquired both through communication among agents and from
the centralized media. One-to-one and one-to-many communication have been
compared by marketing scientists ([8]) as well as cultural evolutionary scientists
([6]), and shown to have different although balanced effects. As reported in
[21], according to classic communication models (see [11]), peer to peer (P2P)
communication is a step-wise, asynchronous process that requires a more or less
lengthy temporal extension: it starts at one point in time and takes effect after
a certain amount of steps, and in each of them it is iterated. On the contrary,
centralized or broadcast communication takes place at once. Whereas broadcast
communication is a one-to-many process ([10]), P2P communication reaches a
smaller audience. As summarized in table 2, two complementary patterns of
properties emerge. Each pattern allows different expected performances. P2P
systems are less efficient and more liable to corruption, although more interactive
and controllable. P2P can either be proactive or reactive, whilst broadcast (BC)
communication generally is only proactive. The former is based upon and aimed
at reciprocating information, whereas broadcast communication can hardly be
expected to be reciprocated (it is often institutional). P2P is spontaneous and
based upon acquaintanceship or familiarity networks, while BC communication,
which is based upon other types of networks, is often facilitated or allowed by
the sharing of new technologies.
Peer-to-Peer Communication (P2P) Broadcast Communication (BC)
one to one/few one to many
asynchronous synchronous
step wise at once
sensitive to temporal extention not affected by temporal extention
interactive proactive
based upon reciprocation no reciprocation
based upon familiarity networks not affected by the network topology
Table 1. A comparison between Peer to Peer and Broadcast communication properties
Which further consequences can we expect from either system? How deep is
their respective influence on the population? How do they interact, when insist-
ing on the same population? Are they interdependent, or is there a dominance of
one system on the other, and if so, which one is more influential? Finally, what
is the effect of their interaction on information quality?
3 Related Works
The effect of communication on opinion formation has been addressed by dif-
ferent disciplines from within the social and the computational sciences, as well
as complex systems science. Social scientists focus on polarization, i.e. the con-
centration of opinions by means of interaction, as one main effect of the ”social
influence” [9]. Social psychology offers an extensive literature on attitude change
models, as reviewed by [16]. Most influential in social psychology is the “The
Social Impact Theory” [20], according to which the amount of influence depends
on the distance, number, and strength (i.e., persuasiveness) of influence sources.
As stated in ([5]), an important variable, poorly controlled in current studies,
is structure topology. Interactions are invariably assumed as either all-to-all or
based on a spatial regular location (lattice), while more realistic scenarios are
ignored.
The most popular model applied to the aggregation of opinions is the bounded
confidence model, presented in [7].
Much like previous studies, in this paper agents exchanging information are
modeled as likely to adjust their opinions only if the preceding and the received
information are close enough to each other. Such aspect is modeled by introduc-
ing a real number , which stands for tolerance or uncertainty ([5]) such that an
agent with opinion x interacts only with agents whose opinions is in the interval
]x− , x+ [.
The model we present in this paper extends the bounded confidence model
by providing agents with two, instead of one, conflicting and independent values
representing their opinions about, say, welfare and security. Furthermore, in the
model agents resort to two additional sources of information, external to the
social network, aimed at representing experts and media.
3.1 Our Previous Works
In our previous works [24], [28], [27, 25], [13] and [21] we investigated the role of
communication systems on agents’ perceptions, by means of multi-agent based
simulations, when informational cheating occurs.
In particular in [23] we focused on the impact of peer-to-peer communication
on the quality of information when central media spread false information. Our
simulations show that the wider the audience reached by the broadcasting sys-
tem, the stronger its influence, especially when people are poorly self-confident
and more likely to accept incoming information. We also showed that for rea-
sonable levels of confidence, P2P communication inhibits the effects of media
broadcasting until this has reached the 40% of the audience. Since the media
plays a fundamental role in the opinion formation of agents, in this paper we ex-
tend the model by introducing an additional source of information differing from
media for both the kind and the perceived reliability of the delivered messages.
4 Research Questions
In our previous work [23] the focus was on the interplay between institutional
broadcasting and P2P communication.
In particular, in our simulation we model the correlation within the frequency
of information delivered by the media and their consequent effects on social
perceptions. This phenomenon, called agenda-setting, has been theorized in 1972
by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in [17]. In that model, agents were
exposed to both the conventional media, repeating the same message at each time
step, and the new media, i.e. the information circulating in the neighborhood.
The results obtained, pointing out the role of both communication systems
on the aggregation of opinions, encouraged us to model another source of infor-
mation, the expert. Agents sometimes have direct access to experts, for example
via Internet. In this paper, we will assume that, when accessing Internet, the
agents are quite confident in the truth-value of the acquired information. Of
course, this assumption is somewhat arbitrary, but what matters here is the
source of influence rather than the way it is found out.
Hence, the follow-up research questions addressed within the present work:
(a) what would happen to agents’ opinions if both conventional and new me-
dia were confronted with an additional P2P-based source of information highly
trusted by the agents? (b) Which is the role of the white-zone, namely the per-
centage of agents that are reached neither by media nor on the Internet? Fur-
thermore, how many experts are needed in a network to reduce the information
asymmetry between agents and conventional media, or, to put it more explic-
itly, how many experts are needed to contrast possible informational cheating
spread within the system? (d) How does the interaction topology, i.e. the net-
work structure, affect the information diffusion and the dynamics of opinions?
In this paper we address the former three sets of questions, leaving the last one
for future works.
5 Definitions
In the simulated system, traditional media send out messages in broadcasting
to a variable percentage of the population, while members communicate with
neighbors and are thus exposed to an additional source of information which
they consider highly reliable, the experts.
In this section the basic definition related with our model and the simulation
results are provided.
5.1 Scale Free Network
Let N be a connected graph, namely a scale free network, in which each node v
has a number of k originating links following a power law distribution P (k) ∼
k−y. We generate a scale free network by progressively adding nodes on a previ-
ously existing network and then introducing links to the existing nodes following
the so called “preferential attachment” mechanism. The construction strategy
of the algorithm aims at maintaining the link probability between any couple of
nodes proportional to the number of existing links ki already connected to the
selected node.
5.2 The General Bounded Confidence
As mentioned above, the most famous model of opinion dynamics based upon
bounded confidence is the one developed by Deffuant and Weisbuch in [7]. The
model can be explained as an asynchronous game in a distributed environment
where the nodes v of the network N , i.e., the agents, interact by exchanging
their opinions. For instance, consider the iterative process over N , where each
element v ∈ N updates its internal state at each time step by comparing its
opinion with the information circulating in the neighborhood. From a theoretical
point of view, this model presents a number of oversimplifications. In particular,
it assumes that low distance is the only determinant of opinion update. Other
aspects, for example, (a) the degree of certainty on one’s opinion and (b) the
extent to which it is shared by others are ignored. The second aspect will be
addressed in future works. For the time being, we limit ourselves to extend
the original model to a slightly more complex situation in which agents have a
generic subjective disposition to accept others’ beliefs, and hold two independent
opinions. Hence, given two agents x and y exchanging their opinions v(x) and
v(y) the entities’ internal states are updated by applying the following rule:
Rule 1
if | v(x)− v(y)| ≤ t
v(x) = v(x) +m(v(y)− v(x)) (1)
Let m be a fixed value within the interval (0..0.5] representing the conver-
gence parameter, i.e. a way to increase the convergence by dividing the distance
d = v(x)− v(y) between two agents’ opinions in 1m steps.
The variable t represents agents’ tolerance, a threshold defining the limit
under which an opinion can be accepted by an agent.
6 Extending The Bounded Confidence Model
Our model extends the model of Deffuant by providing agents with two conflict-
ing values representing their opinions: one related to welfare and one related to
security. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1 in the model agents get informed
by accessing two different additional sources of information: experts and media.
Fig. 1. The Communication Model
We refer to agents accessing the former source as wise agents, while agents
accessing the latter are called televiewers.
In general, to process information, agents apply the rule of bounded confi-
dence; on the contrary, a wise agent is more inclined to accept the information
acquired by the experts.
6.1 Entities of the Model
In this section the agents protocol and their interaction patterns will be intro-
duced.
Media. Conventional media is simulated as a special agency, reporting the same
message at each simulation turn to a subset of the agents’ set V .
The media agent m ∈ M is not linked to the network and has the goal to
persuade the audience that security is a matter more important than welfare.
The media’s reported message is denoted by the following set:
{ml,mr, V1 | 0 ≤ ml ≤ 1 ∧ 0 ≤ mr ≤ 1, V1 ⊂ V } (2)
where ml,mr represent the media reported values of events respectively re-
lated to welfare and security issues.
Interacting Peers. The audience is composed by agents (i.e. the network
nodes), whose shared goal is to exchange information with other agents in one’s
neighborhood. They also receive messages from the media and from the wise
agents.
When interacting with one another, agents v ∈ V are provided with an
internal state defined as follows:
{vl, vr | 0 ≤ vl ≤ 1 ∧ 0 ≤ vr ≤ 1} (3)
respectively representing agents’ beliefs about welfare and security issues.
The closer vl and vr values are to 1, the more each debated issue (i.e. welfare
and security) is considered to be important by the agent considered.
The agents’ internal state, in the protocol, corresponds to the message sent
as an answer to each external request of information coming from its neighbours.
The initial configuration of agents’ opinions is set up according to a uniform
random distribution.
Wiseagents and Televiewers. The set of agents V is composed by two kinds
of agents, each subpopulation is denoted by the source of information accessed.
Agents accessing experts will be called WiseAgents (WAs), those exposed to
media will be called TeleViewers (TVs).
WiseAgents and TeleViewers differ in the way they process the information
acquired. The former are highly confident in its truth value while the latter
process the media information as the information they receive from peers, i.e.
by applying the bounded confidence model mechanism.
6.2 The Model Interaction
Media and Peers. At each simulation turn the media agency sends the tele-
viewers the same message {el, er, V1}.
Agents acquire information from media agencies according to a passive pro-
tocol, by acquiring the values they send and comparing them with their previous
opinions. Information is either accepted or not, based on the bounded confidence
mechanism ([?]).
The agent’s opinions vl, vr and the information from the media mld,mrd are
transformed in two new agent’s opinions. The function generates two new values
for vl, vr. The variable t ∈ < stands for peer agents’ tolerance, i.e., the subjective
disposition to accept others’ information. The two guard variables gl and gr are
calculated by the Boolean expression returning true if the difference between
acquired and owned information is below the tolerance threshold t. The guard
variables gl and gr respectively control the access to the updated values of vl
and vr, which is implemented on two independent opinion spaces. The values of
vl and vr are updated through the following:
vl = (vl + (mld(vl −mld))
vr = (vr +mrd(vr −mrd))
Among Interacting Peers. Agents exchange information by comparing their
preferences. This interaction is executed after both TeleViewers and WiseAgents
receive the information by their respective sources.
Each agent communicates with the set of neighbours within a distance set
to 1. We will follow [?]’ convention, according to which, when communication
occurs between any two agents, these mix their opinions when the differences is
smaller than the threshold t. For example, assuming that two agents’ opinions
are respectively represented by x and xi if | x − xi |≤ t their opinions will be
mixed by applying the 1 rule on both the agents preferences.
7 Experiments
The experiments design has been performed with the main aim to perform a
what-if analysis, based upon simulations, on the effect of information and com-
munication on social perceptions.
We focus on the effect of two different sources of information, reporting dif-
ferent (and complementary) messages to the audience, on the agents’ opinions
trend. In particular we stress the polarization of opinions toward one of the two
main debated issues, which in the model corresponds to security and welfare.
The main goal of the media is to persuade the audience that security is more
important than welfare (reporting the same message respectively fixed to 8 for
security and 3 for welfare). On the contrary, agents resorting to experts (giving
respectively 3 for security and 8 for welfare) consider welfare more desirable than
security.
In addition, experts and media differ as to the way their information is trusted
by the agents. On the one hand, Wise Agents accept the information provided by
the experts without applying the proviso of the bounded confidence model, mean-
ing that the information is assumed as truthful. On the other hand, TeleViewers,
when acquiring information from the media, adjust their beliefs according to the
bounded confidence model.
Below, we will discuss the initial results of our model, in order to check
whether it is of any utility in addressing the research questions raised within
this work.
7.1 Scenario 1: Media and Experts
The first set of scenarios aims at exploring the consequences of different percent-
ages of agents exposed to the main streams of information. Hence, each scenario
is characterized by an increasing degree of exposure to conventional media and
by a decreasing number of experts.
As one can see from the experimental settings listed in details in Table 2, the
population is composed by 100 agents (NA) endowed with the ability to process
the information through a variable level of confidence (TOL). A subset of agents
(WAs) can access a different source of information with values different from
the ones reported on by the media (TVs). Each scenario has been simulated in
ten runs. In short these experiments are aimed at understanding the mutual ef-
fects of different information (with complementary values) delivered by different
agencies.
7.2 Emerging Results from Media and Experts
The results emerging from the first battery of experiments are shown in Figure
2 where the aggregate values of both agents’ opinions on security and welfare
matters, for increasing presence of WAs, are reported. The figures report the
opinion trends for different levels of tolerance (0.2, 0.5, 0.8).
All figures show the same effect: the higher the presence of WAs the more
the agents’ opinions converge toward the values reported on by the experts (3
for security and 8 for welfare). On the contrary, namely when the media reach
the largest amount of the total population (and WAs are on the lowest level),
no convergence can be observed but only the reduction of the distances among
values. In our view this phenomenon indicates that, consistent with our previous
results, the efficacy of traditional media are sensitive to the effect of peer-to-
peer communication. By definition WAs do not process the information with
Table 2. Experiments Settings
NA MB WAs TOL
100 0 100 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 10 90 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 20 80 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 30 70 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 40 60 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 50 50 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 60 40 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 70 30 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 80 20 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 90 10 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 100 0 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
the bounded confidence mechanism, thus the tolerance does not affect opinion
adjustment.
(a) Tolerance: 0.2 (b) Tolerance: 0.5
(c) Tolerance: 0.8
Fig. 2. Opinion Trend under Peer Pressure without Black Zone
Notice the extent to which the opinion trend passes the line of the average
value (i.e. 0.5). The WAs effect is relevant when the global tolerance is fixed
to 2: the 30% of WAs is sufficient to invert the effect on mass opinions of the
70% of TWs. Furthermore when tolerance is higher (5), the number of WAs
needed to inhibit media is smaller (20%). One may expect that tolerance plays a
fundamental role in opinions’ convergence toward the media or the WAs values.
Results indicate that the high level of confidence in buying others’ information
has a side effect: WAs are less efficient when tolerance is high, meaning that if
uncertainty is strong agents are inclined to accept any information as truthful,
even that provided by the media.
7.3 Scenario 2: Media, Internet and Uninformed Agents
The second scenario is similar to the previous one, except for the diverse distri-
bution of WAs and TVs. In the preceding experiment the total amount of the
population is either reached by the media, or resorts to experts. Peer-to-peer
communication inhibits the spreading of information from the media, but what
would happen if a given percentage of agents is reached neither by the media nor
by the experts? In other words, let us assume that in the scenarios characterized
by an increase of TVs (and consequently by a decrease of WAs), a 30% of the
agents, that we call the white zone, use only the information circulating in the
neighborhood as their main source of information.
As one can see from the experimental settings listed in details in Table 3, the
population is composed by 100 agents (NA) endowed with the ability to process
the information through a variable level of confidence (TOL). A subset of agents
(WAs) can access a different source of information with values different from
the ones reported on by the media (TVs). This battery of experiments aims at
understanding the effect of the two sources of information also on agents that
are never directly reached by them. In particular the agents lying in the white
zone will receive the information delivered either by experts and media but only
through their neighbors. Such a process of information transmission propagates
information through all the interaction topology: a message delivered by an agent
will get far away on the network.
Each scenario has been simulated in ten runs.
7.4 Emerging Results from Media, Internet and Uninformed Agents
The results emerging from this set of experiments are shown in Figure 3, where
the aggregate values of agents’ opinions with respect to welfare and security are
reported for the various different scenarios, each one denoted by an increasing
number of WAs and a decreasing number of TVs. The figures reported on the
different scenarios stand for different values of tolerance (0.2, 0.5, 0.8). Remember
that tolerance is the threshold representing the limit within which an information
can be taken into account by the agents or not. Hence the higher the tolerance the
more likely the agents will be to trust informers. As derived from our hypotheses,
the white zone matters. Looking at the initial portion of each box in Figure 3, in
Table 3. Experiments Settings
NA MB WAs T
100 0 70 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 10 60 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 20 50 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 30 40 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 40 30 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 50 20 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 60 10 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
100 70 0 0.2,0.5 and 0.8
which all agents are TVs (and WAs are absents), the average values for security
and welfare are never the same as the messages spread by the media.
(a) Tolerance: 0.2 (b) Tolerance: 0.5
(c) Tolerance: 0.8
Fig. 3. Opinion Trends with the 30% of agents being not reached by media and experts
There is a clear evidence of the capacity of peer-to-peer communication to
inhibit the effect played by the central media. Furthermore, this evidence is
amplified by the white zone (i.e. the 30% of agents not directly reached by
the media nor by the experts). Looking at the pictures shown in Figure 2,
the distance between the initial values of opinions and the media’s message is
smaller than the same distance in the second scenario. Looking at the pictures
reproduced in Figure 2, the distance between the initial values of opinions and
the media’s message is smaller than the same distance in the second scenario.
Even when TVs are predominant, the central media do not lead to opinions
converging on the values they transmit.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, the dynamics of two relatively independent opinions in a simulated
network is observed. Plunged into the network, agents characterized as more or
less likely to exchange opinions with neighbors are also exposed to information
broadcasted by central media.
A first series of experiments shows that when central media spread false
news, P2P communication can reduce the effect of informational cheating until
the broadcasting message has reached around half the population, but it tends
to lose this compensating effect for increasing values of agents’ exposure to in-
formational cheating. Even a small number of experts can dramatically re-orient
agents’ opinions. This effect is less flashy when agents are more likely to accept
others’ opinions, what should not come as a surprise: the less confident agents
are, the more they tend to oscillate among different opinions. Instead, the more
confident they are, the lesser they are likely to converge on either the experts’ or
anyone else opinions. However, with a mild level of confidence the expert source
is more efficacious in contrasting the impact of informational cheating.
A second series of experiments shows the effect of peer-to-peer communica-
tion. When a certain percentage of the population is not directly reached neither
by the media nor by the experts, the agents’ opinions do not totally converge
on the messages spread by the media, not even for the highest number of agents
exposed to the media and the lowest number of agents’ accessing the experts.
The results obtained so far provide some tentative answers to our initial
questions. What is the impact of P2P communication on information quality,
when agents are exposed to central media information flooding? It depends on
how pervasive the broadcasting is: peer-to-peer communication can contrast the
impact of the complementary system until when no more than 60% of the pop-
ulation is reached by the broadcasted messages. How much experts must be
accessed through the P2P system for contrasting informational cheating? It de-
pends on agents’ confidence in their own opinions: when this is too high or too
low, a larger number of experts (30% or more) is needed to contrast informa-
tional cheating. When confidence is neither too high nor too low, even a small
percentage (around 20% ) is enough to obtain the same results.
Is peer-to-peer communication able to inhibit the information flooding ex-
ercised by the central media, inhibiting possible information cheating and con-
taining the corruption of information? Our simulation provides a preliminary
positive answer to this question. A white zone, in which there are no televiewers
nor wise agents and in which agents can access information only through their
neighbors, prevents opinions from converging on the values transmitted through
the central media. Peer-to-peer communication matters in reducing aggregation
of opinions.
As several recent research works have outlined out the importance of the
dynamic aspects of social interactions [29, 15, 3, 22, 4, 1], in future studies we
are interested to characterise the opinions’ evolution and how their behavior is
affected by the dynamic nature of contacts. In addition, we aim at implementing
a more plausible model of opinions, taking into account other dimensions beside
confidence, in particular the perceived correspondence between own and others’
opinions and how these dimensions interact in the dynamics of beliefs.
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